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Abstract. Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been enormously suc-
cessful across a variety of prediction tasks. However, recent research
shows that DNNs are particularly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which
poses a serious threat to their applications in security-sensitive sys-
tems. In this paper, we propose a simple yet effective defense algorithm
Defense-VAE that uses variational autoencoder (VAE) to purge adver-
sarial perturbations from contaminated images. The proposed method is
generic and can defend white-box and black-box attacks without the need
of retraining the original CNN classifiers, and can further strengthen the
defense by retraining CNN or end-to-end finetuning the whole pipeline.
In addition, the proposed method is very efficient compared to the optimization-
based alternatives, such as Defense-GAN, since no iterative optimiza-
tion is needed for online prediction. Extensive experiments on MNIST,
Fashion-MNIST, CelebA and CIFAR-10 demonstrate the superior de-
fense accuracy of Defense-VAE compared to Defense-GAN, while being
50x faster than the latter. This makes Defense-VAE widely deployable
in real-time security-sensitive systems. Our source code can be found at
https://github.com/lxuniverse/defense-vae.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated remarkable success in solving
complex prediction tasks. However, recent studies show that they are particularly
vulnerable to adversarial attacks [2,23,30] in the form of small perturbations to
inputs that lead DNNs to predict incorrect outputs. For images, such perturba-
tions are often almost imperceptible to human vision system, while being very
effective at fooling DNN-based systems. Both white-box attacks [25] and black-
box attacks [24] have been proposed to attack DNNs, and they can often fool
the network with high probabilities. These attacks pose a serious threat to the
applications of DNNs in security-sensitive systems, e.g., identity authentication
surveillance, self-driving cars, malware detection, and voice command recogni-
tion. As a result, it is critical to develop effective and efficient defense mechanisms
to counter adversarial attacks.
In this paper, we propose a simple yet effective defense mechanism called
Defense-VAE that uses Variational AutoEncoder (VAE) [11, 27] to purge the
adversarial perturbations from contaminated images before feeding the images
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Fig. 1. Defense-VAE purges adversarial perturbations from contaminated images.
Example images are from MNIST, F-MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CelebA, respectively.
FGSM [7] with  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 are used to generate the adversarial attacks.
to the downstream CNN classifiers. To illustrate the idea, we generate some ad-
versarial images based on the FGSM attack [7] with  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 on
four popular image classification benchmarks: MNIST [14], Fashion-MNIST [32],
CIFAR-10 [12] and CelebA [15]. These adversarial images are then fed into
Defense-VAE for reconstruction. Figure 1 illustrates some of the typical exam-
ples from Defense-VAE. As we can see, the Defense-VAE generated images are
the faithful reconstructions from the underlying clean images, with the majority
of adversarial perturbations removed. As we will demonstrate later, such recon-
structed images can recover almost all the accuracy losses due to adversarial
attacks, without introducing much computation overhead compared to Defense-
GAN [29], a closely related state-of-the-art defense algorithm that is based on
Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [6].
Compared with the state-of-the-art defense algorithms, our method has the
following properties:
– Defense-VAE is very generic and can defend white-box attacks and black-
box attacks without the need of retraining the original CNN classifiers, and
can further strengthen the defense by retraining or end-to-end finetuning;
– Defense-VAE achieves much higher accuracy than the state-of-the-art de-
fense algorithms on white-box and black-box attacks. Especially, it outper-
forms Defense-GAN by about 30% in defending black-box attacks on F-
MNIST;
– Defense-VAE is very efficient compared to the optimization-based alterna-
tives, such as Defense-GAN, as no iterative optimization is needed for online
prediction. From our experiments, it shows that Defense-VAE is about 50x
faster than Defense-GAN. This makes our method widely deployable in real-
time security-sensitive applications.
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2 Defense-VAE: The Proposed Algorithm
At a high level, Defense-VAE is a defense algorithm that is based on deep gen-
erative models for image reconstruction. That is, given an adversarial image
as input, the generative model attempts to produce a denoised image that is
closely related to the underlying clean image, with the adversarial perturbations
removed. As the name suggested, Defense-VAE is built upon Variational Au-
toEncoder (VAE) [11,27]. Therefore, we first give a brief introduction to VAE.
2.1 Variational Auto-Encoder
Variational Autoencoder (VAE) [11,27] is one of the most powerful deep gener-
ative models that is based on latent variable models. It consists of an encoder
network to encode an input image to the latent variable z and a decoder network
to decode the latent variable z back to the image domain:
z ∼ Enc(x) = q(z|x), x ∼ Dec(z) = p(x|z). (1)
Since the maximum likelihood (ML) estimate of this latent variable model is
intractable, a variational lower bound (ELBO) is optimized instead:
LVAE = −Eq(z|x)
[
log
p(x|z)p(z)
q(z|x)
]
(2)
= −Eq(z|x)[log p(x|z)] +DKL(q(z|x)‖p(z))
where the first term is the reconstruction error and the second term is a regular-
ization that prefers the posterior to be close to the prior. Typically, a simple unit
Gaussian prior is assumed in VAE. To facilitate efficient computation, a diagonal
covariance Gaussian posterior is further assumed, which enables the use of the
reparameterization trick to reduce the variance of Monte-Carlo sampling [11].
As a generative model, VAE can generate high quality images that follow the
similar distribution of the training images.
2.2 Defense-VAE
VAE is typically trained to reproduce the same image from an input image. As
for adversarial defense, reproducing the same adversarial images is an undesir-
able task as the adversarial perturbations may be preserved during the image
reconstruction. Instead, in Defense-VAE, we modify the encoder and the decoder
of the latent variable model as follows:
z ∼ Enc(xˆ) = q(z|xˆ), x ∼ Dec(z) = p(x|z), (3)
where xˆ = x+ δ is an adversarial image with the perturbation δ added on top
of a clean image x. This adversarial image is encoded to a latent variable z,
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Fig. 2. Training pipeline of Defense-VAE. Defense-VAE (left) and Classifier-REC
(right) can be trained separately, or jointly end-to-end (from scratch or by fine-tuning).
See text for more details.
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Fig. 3. Test pipeline of Defense-VAE
which is decoded to the underlying clean image x. Accordingly, the training loss
of Defense-VAE is updated as follows:
LDefense−VAE = −Eq(z|xˆ)
[
log
p(x|z)p(z)
q(z|xˆ)
]
(4)
= −Eq(z|xˆ)[log p(x|z)] +DKL(q(z|xˆ)‖p(z)),
where the input to Defense-VAE is an adversarial image xˆ = x + δ, and the
expected output is the underlying clean image x. The compatibility between
input and output pair is measured by the loss function 4.
To train the Defense-VAE model, we can generate adversarial images given
any clean image from a training set. Since there are many different adversarial
attack algorithms and for each attack algorithm we can generate multiple ad-
versarial images with different configurations, we can in principle generate an
unlimited amount of training pairs for Defense-VAE, i.e., multiple adversarial
images can be mapped to one clean image. The detailed training pipeline is
demonstrated in Figure 2 (left). Being an effective approach of generating suffi-
cient training pairs for Defense-VAE, using multiple attack algorithms to produce
adversarial training examples will also boost the capability of Defense-VAE to
counter an ensemble of adversarial attacks and make Defense-VAE a generic de-
fense algorithm that is robust to a wide range of attacks. As we will discuss later,
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this ensemble training strategy entails Defense-VAE superior defense capability
over Defense-GAN.
Once the Defense-VAE model is trained, we can also use the reconstructed
images from Defense-VAE to retrain the downstream CNN classifiers Figure 2
(right). As we will see later, the retrained CNN classifier can further boost the
defense accuracy over the original CNN classifier.
We can also train the whole pipeline end to end from scratch or finetuning
from pre-trained VAE and CNN classifier by optimizing the joint loss function:
LEnd−to−End = LDefense−VAE + λLCross−Entropy. (5)
As we will see from the experiments, this end to end training can boost the
defense accuracy even further.
After training the Defense-VAE model and potentially retraining CNN classi-
fiers or end-to-end finetuning the whole pipeline, we can use the trained Defense-
VAE to purge the adversarial perturbations from any contaminated images, and
the reconstructed images are then fed to the original CNN classifier or retrained
CNN classifier for the final image classification. This test pipeline is shown in
Figure 3.
3 Related Work
Adversarial attacks and defenses is one of the active research areas in deep
learning, with tens of different attack and defense algorithms developed in the
past few years. For a general introduction to this exciting research area and
the related terminologies, we refer the readers to [29, 31, 34] for more details.
Here we will focus on the defense algorithms that are most closely related to
Defense-VAE.
Defending against adversarial attacks is a challenging task. Different types
of defense algorithms [19, 26] have been proposed in the past few years. The
first type of defense algorithms [4, 9, 16] augments the training data to make
the DNN model resilient to the trained adversarial attacks. The second type
of defense algorithms [5, 8, 17, 21, 22, 28] modifies the training process by in-
troducing regularization to the objective functions. The third type of defense
algorithms [1,10,33] attempts to remove the adversarial perturbations via input
transformations before feeding the image to the classifier. According to this cat-
egorization, our Defense-VAE belongs to the input transformation based defense
approach. In the following, we will therefore review the defense algorithms that
are closely related to our work.
Adversarial training [7, 13] is a popular and well investigated defense ap-
proach against adversarial attacks. It attempts to use adversarial images as data
augmentation to train a robust classifier. It shows that this method can improve
the defense accuracy effectively and sometimes it can even improve the accu-
racy upon the model trained only on the original clean training set. However,
this defense mechanism is more effective in white-box attacks than in black-box
6 X. Li, S. Ji
attacks due to the gradient masking problem. In Defense-VAE, we also use ad-
versarial examples to improve the robustness of the defense model. However,
instead of improving the targeted CNN classifiers directly, adversarial training
is used to train a Defense-VAE model to purge adversarial perturbations for the
downstream CNN classifiers.
Magnet proposed by Meng and Chen [18] is another effective strategy to de-
fend adversarial attacks. Magnet has two phases for defense: detector network
and reformer network. Detector network learns the manifold of the normal clean
images so that it can detect if an input image is an adversarial. If an image is de-
tected as an adversarial, it will be forwarded to the reformer network, which will
modify the adversarial image to the manifold of normal images. In Magnet, the
reformer network is trained only on clean images with the goal of reconstructing
the same clean input images, while Defense-VAE is trained on adversarial and
clean image pairs with the goal of removing the adversarial perturbations from
the contaminated images.
Another closely related work is Defense-GAN that is proposed by Saman-
gouei et. al. in [29], where a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [6] is used
to reconstruct a clean image from an adversarial image. Defense-GAN firstly
trains a GAN model purely on a training set of clean images, and as such it
learns the distribution of the normal images. Then given an adversarial image,
multiple iterations of back-propagations are used to identify a proper z from the
clean image latent space, such that after decoded through the GAN generator,
the reconstructed image is expected to be as close as possible to the adver-
sarial image. Given the non-convex loss function of the GAN generator model,
multiple random z’s are used to initialize the back-propagation image search.
Typically, given an adversarial image, Defense-GAN needs to perform L itera-
tions of back-propagation for each of R random initializations, with the typical
values of L = 200 and R = 10. As a comparison, to reconstruction a clean image,
Defense-VAE can directly identify a proper z by forward-propagating an adver-
sarial image through the VAE encoder network, and the z is subsequently used
to reconstruct a clean image through the VAE-decoder network. No expensive
iterative online optimization is needed in Defense-VAE. As we will discuss later,
such reconstructed images are not only more accurate, but the whole process is
much faster than Defense-GAN.
4 Experiments
We validate our algorithm on four popular image classification benchmarks:
MNIST [14], F-MNIST [32], CelebA [15] and CIFAR-10 [12]. MNIST and F-
MNIST are two gray-level image datasets, each containing 60,000 training im-
ages and 10,000 test images with the size of 28×28. While MNIST consists of 10
hand-written digits, F-MNIST contains 10 different articles, e.g., shoes, shirts,
etc. CelebA contains 202,599 RGB images of human faces, split into training
and test sets. We use this dataset for binary classification to distinguish if a face
image is from a male or a female. CIFAR-10 contains 10 classes of RGB images
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of the size of 32× 32, in which 50,000 images are for training and 10,000 images
are for test.
We consider both the white-box attacks and the black-box attacks to test
the defense performance of our algorithm. For the white-box attacks, FGSM [7],
Randomized FGSM [13], and CW [3] attacks are used. For the black-box attacks,
we train a substitute model to generate adversarial images to attack the targeted
CNN classifiers. For a fair comparison, our experimental setups closely follow
those of Defense-GAN 1.
To demonstrate the generalization of our algorithm, we test our algorithms
with the targeted CNN classifiers of different architectures: different number
of convolutional or full-connected layers, different convolution parameters, and
with/without dropout or batch normalization. For the black-box attacks, differ-
ent architectures are also considered for the substitute models. When we present
results, we denote the targeted model as A, B, C, D and the substitute model
as B, E. Detailed network architectures of the VAE model, the targeted CNN
classifiers and their substitutes are summarized in Appendix A.
For the defense algorithms, we compare our algorithm with Adversarial Train-
ing [7, 13], MagNet [18] and Defense-GAN [29]. All of our experiments are per-
formed on NVIDIA Titan-Xp GPUs. Our source code can be found at https:
//github.com/lxuniverse/defense-vae.
4.1 Results on White-box Attacks
First, we test our algorithm on three types of white-box attacks: FGSM, RAND-
FGSM and CW attacks. The targeted CNN models are trained on the original
training dataset for 10 epochs until convergence. Then for each clean training
image we generate 12 different adversarial images by using 3 different white-box
attack algorithms, each with 4 different configurations. For FGSM and RAND-
FGSM, 4 different  = 0.25, 0.3, 0.35 and 0.4 are used. For the CW attack, 4
different learning rates lr = 6, 8, 10 and 12 are used. We combine these adver-
sarial images and the original clean images to form the input and output pairs
to train the Defense-VAE model. We initialize the weights of VAE with the nor-
mal distribution of N (0, 0.02) for the convolutional layers and N (1, 0.02) for the
batch normalization layers. We note that usually 5 epochs are required for the
Defense-VAE models to converge.
Additionally, we use the reconstructed images of Defense-VAE to retrain the
CNN classifiers to improve the classification accuracy. Although the original
CNN classifiers have already yielded very competitive performance compared
with Defense-GAN, we note that retraining CNN classifiers for Defense-VAE
can further strengthen the defense accuracy notably. Interestingly, the authors
of Defense-GAN reported that for Defense-GAN retraining of CNN classifiers has
negligible impact to the defense accuracy, while this is not true for Defense-VAE.
As discussed in Sec. 2.2, we can also train the whole pipeline end to end
by optimizing the joint loss function 5 directly. This can be done through two
1 https://github.com/kabkabm/defensegan
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Fig. 4. The end-to-end finetuning can boost the defense accuracy even further, and
yields the strongest defense model.
approaches: (1) randomly initialize the VAE and CNN classifier model parame-
ters and train the whole pipeline from scratch, and (2) pretrain VAE and CNN
classifier separately and finetune the whole pipeline. Our experiments show that
both approaches are almost equally effective, with the finetuning yielding slightly
better results. We therefore only report the finetuning results in the following.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of this end-to-end finetuning approach, we
provide one typical learning curve of the finetuning process in Figure 4, where
the adversarial attacks are generated by FGSM with  = 0.3. Starting from sep-
arately pretrained VAE model and CNN classifier (a.k.a., Defense-VAE-REC),
we finetune the whole pipeline by optimizing the joint loss function 5. As we can
see, the end-to-end finetuning boosts the defense accuracy by about 4% over the
Defense-VAE model.
Table 1 reports the defense accuracies of Defense-VAE on three different
white-box attacks: FGSM, RAND-FGSM and CW attacks. As a comparison, we
also include the results of Defense-GAN, MagNet and Adversarial Training under
the same experimental setups; for those results, we import them directly from
the Defense-GAN paper [29]. As we can see, Defense-VAE and Defense-GAN are
very competitive to each other, and outperform all the other defense algorithms
by significant margins on all four benchmarks. Defense-VAE achieves superior
performance over Defense-GAN, and can recover almost all the accuracy losses
due to the adversarial attacks. We also note that retraining CNN classifiers
(Defense-VAE-REC) and finetuning (Defense-VAE-E2E) can further improve
the defense accuracies beyond the original CNN classifiers (Defense-VAE) by
a notable margin, with the finetuning yielding the strongest defense against
adversarial attacks.
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Attack
Classifier
Model
No
Attack
No
Defense
Defense
VAE
Defense
VAE-REC
Defense
VAE-E2E
Defense
GAN
MagNet
Adv. Tr.
 = 0.3
FGSM
 = 0.3
A 90.85 9.18 86.9 89.03 91.02 87.9 8.9 79.7
B 71.62 15.89 70.88 74.41 77.86 62.9 16.8 13.6
C 90.78 8.68 85.8 89.72 90.85 89.6 11.0 80.4
D 86.94 8.51 85.36 87.09 89.26 87.5 9.9 69.8
RAND
FGSM
 = 0.3
α = 0.05
A 90.85 7.91 86.42 88.91 90.57 88.8 9.6 44.7
B 71.62 13.14 71.12 73.91 77.09 66.1 16.1 11.9
C 90.78 5.48 86.42 89.38 90.28 89.3 11.2 69.9
D 86.94 7.79 85.77 87.18 88.97 86.2 10.4 62.6
CW
l2 norm
A 90.85 11.67 81.81 86.99 88.54 89.6 6.0 15.7
B 71.62 18.74 67.43 73.69 74.72 65.6 13.1 11.8
C 90.78 7.70 78.64 87.47 88.69 89.6 8.4 10.7
D 86.94 9.35 64.38 86.21 87.83 87.5 6.9 14.9
Average 84.05 10.34 79.24 84.50 86.31 82.55 10.69 40.48
Attack
Classifier
Model
No
Attack
No
Defense
Defense
VAE
Defense
VAE-REC
Defense
VAE-E2E
Defense
GAN
MagNet
Adv. Tr.
 = 0.3
FGSM
 = 0.3
A 99.15 14.65 98.29 98.98 99.28 98.8 19.1 65.1
B 96.10 1.81 95.92 95.97 96.91 95.6 8.2 6.0
C 99.08 29.53 98.41 98.91 99.24 98.9 16.3 78.6
D 97.87 4.33 97.56 98.16 98.05 98.0 9.4 73.2
RAND
FGSM
 = 0.3
α = 0.05
A 99.15 8.65 98.40 99.08 99.34 98.8 17.1 77.4
B 96.10 1.65 95.83 96.04 96.87 94.4 9.1 13.8
C 99.08 5.99 98.33 98.87 99.35 98.5 15.1 90.7
D 97.87 3.25 97.81 98.3 98.05 98.0 11.5 53.9
CW
l2 norm
A 99.15 8.45 92.69 95.12 96.95 98.9 3.8 7.7
B 96.10 3.00 87.66 88.56 95.08 91.6 3.4 28.0
C 99.08 5.53 94.46 96.05 96.44 98.9 2.5 3.1
D 97.87 3.92 83.42 89.46 95.71 98.3 2.1 1.0
Average 98.05 7.56 94.90 96.13 97.61 97.39 9.80 27.38
Table 1. Classification accuracies of different defense methods under FGSM, RAND-
FGSM and CW white-box attacks on the (top) F-MNIST and (bottom) MNIST image
classification benchmarks. The defense accuracies of Defense-GAN, MagNet, and Ad-
versarial Training are from Defense-GAN [29]. Results on CelebA and CIFAR-10 have
the same pattern as above. Details can be found in Appendix B.
4.2 Robustness under Untrained Attacks
In principle we can train Defense-VAE on all known adversarial attacks to best
counter possible attacks in test. However, in reality new attacks are constantly
invented; it’s almost certain that after the deployment of Defense-VAE, some
new adversarial attacks will emerge and Defense-VAE has never been trained
on those attacks. To investigate the robustness of Defense-VAE in this circum-
stance, in this part of the experiments we train Defense-VAE on two attacks and
test its defense capability against the third untrained attack. Again, three adver-
sarial attacks are considered: FGSM, RAND-FGSM and CW, which gives three
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possible combinations that are shown in Table 2. As we can see, Defense-VAE
is very robust for the first two attacks: FGSM and RAND-FGSM as the defense
accuracies largely remain the same as it’s trained on all three attacks. But for
the CW attack, Defense-VAE is less robust, manifested by the significant accu-
racy loss compared to the Defense-VAE trained on all three attacks. Indeed, the
CW attack is considered a much stronger attack and could have a very distinct
attack pattern to that of FGSM and RAND-FGSM. We therefore incorporate
Deepfool [19] to the training of Defense-VAE to counter the untrained CW at-
tack since DeepFool and CW have very similar attack patterns. The results in
parentheses show that this is indeed the case and Defense-VAE again can recover
the most accuracy losses under untrained CW attack.
Attack Classifier Trained on other 2 Trained on 3
FGSM
A 87.34 89.03
B 73.38 74.41
C 88.03 89.72
D 86.49 87.09
RAND
FGSM
A 87.30 88.91
B 73.59 73.91
C 88.19 89.38
D 86.73 87.18
CW
A 43.48 (85.06) 86.99
B 34.52 (71.64) 73.69
C 44.45 (85.22) 87.47
D 30.77 (84.69) 86.21
Table 2. Defense accuracy of Defense-VAE when it’s trained on two attacks but is
used to defend another attack. The results in parentheses are the accuracies after
incorporating DeepFool [20] as additional adversarial training examples for Defense-
VAE.
4.3 Results on Black-box Attacks
Next, we test the defense capability of Defense-VAE under black-box attacks on
the MNIST and F-MNIST datasets. We train the targeted CNN model on the
training set for 10 epochs with the batch size of 100 and the learning rate of
10−3 until convergence. Then the substitute model is trained with 150 images
from the test set with the labels predicted by the targeted CNN classifier.
In the black-box attacks, Defense-VAE, as a defender, has no prior knowledge
of the trained substitute model. Thus, we can only train Defense-VAE on the
white-box attacks. Therefore, the same Defense-VAE model trained from the ex-
periments of white-box attacks is used to defend the black-box attacks. 2 In this
experiment, 4 targeted CNN classifiers: A, B, C, and D, and 2 substitute mod-
els: B and E are considered, and this produces 8 possible Classifier/Substitute
combinations. In this part of experiments, only the black-box FGSM attack is
2 In other words, we just need to train one Defense-VAE to defend both white-box
and black-box attacks.
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Classifier/
Substitute
No
Attack
No
Defense
Defense-
VAE
Defense-
VAE-REC
Defense-
VAE-E2E
Defense-
GAN
MagNet
Adv. Tr.
 = 0.3
A/B 90.85 37.92 83.69 86.64 86.39 58.60 54.04 73.93
A/E 90.85 24.94 76.97 83.02 83.61 47.90 33.11 69.45
B/B 71.62 17.61 73.66 72.42 75.22 49.40 38.12 31.77
B/E 71.62 13.44 69.29 69.36 71.78 37.20 31.19 26.17
C/B 90.78 39.14 83.64 86.88 87.67 52.89 46.64 77.91
C/E 90.78 22.89 76.27 80.16 80.32 48.71 30.16 75.04
D/B 86.94 32.87 80.31 85.80 84.78 57.79 54.78 61.72
D/E 86.94 23.51 70.66 79.48 77.53 40.07 33.96 50.93
Average 85.05 26.54 76.81 80.47 80.91 49.07 40.25 58.37
Classifier/
Substitute
No
Attack
No
Defense
Defense-
VAE
Defense-
VAE-REC
Defense-
VAE-E2E
Defense-
GAN
MagNet
Adv. Tr.
 = 0.3
A/B 99.15 65.89 98.68 98.71 99.16 93.12 69.37 96.54
A/E 99.15 76.32 98.64 98.92 99.19 91.39 67.10 96.68
B/B 96.10 14.40 95.89 95.95 96.71 90.57 56.87 20.92
B/E 96.10 26.48 96.26 95.81 97.09 88.41 46.27 11.20
C/B 99.08 60.74 97.91 98.02 99.15 93.57 75.71 98.34
C/E 99.08 72.73 98.30 98.59 99.28 92.23 67.60 98.43
D/B 97.87 33.36 97.68 98.22 97.85 92.72 68.17 76.67
D/E 97.87 39.95 97.72 98.22 97.69 91.64 60.73 76.76
Average 98.05 48.73 97.63 97.81 98.27 91.71 63.98 71.92
Table 3. Classification accuracies of different defense methods under FGSM black-
box attacks on different image classification benchmarks: (top) F-MNIST, (bottom)
MNIST. The defense accuracies of Defense-GAN, MagNet, and Adversarial Training
are from the Defense-GAN paper [29]. Results on CIFAR-10 have the same pattern as
above. Details can be found in Appendix B.
considered, with the results on MNIST and F-MNIST reported in Table 3. As a
comparison, we also include the results of Defense-GAN, MagNet and Adversar-
ial Training under the same experimental setups; again, for this set of results,
we import them directly from the Defense-GAN paper [29]. As we can see, on
both datasets Defense-VAE outperforms Defense-GAN and all other defense al-
gorithms by significant margins. In particular, on F-MNIST, Defense-VAE im-
proves the accuracy over Defense-GAN by about 30%. Also, as in the white-box
attack experiments, retrained CNN classifiers (Defense-VAE-REC) and finetun-
ing (Defense-VAE-E2E) can further boost the defense accuracies over the orig-
inal CNN classifiers (Defense-VAE) by a notable margin, with the end-to-end
finetuning yielding the best defense accuracies among all the methods.
4.4 Why is Defense-VAE so effective?
The results above demonstrated superior performance of Defense-VAE over Defense-
GAN. For the black-box FGSM attack, the former even outperforms the latter
by about 30%. To understand why Defense-VAE can have such a large leap,
we investigate the reconstructed images by Defense-VAE and Defense-GAN in
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this experimental setup, i.e., the black-box FGSM attack on F-MNIST. Figure 5
shows some typical examples from this experiment. As can be seen, the recon-
structed images from Defense-VAE often preserve the correct class information of
their underlying clean images, while Defense-GAN has a harder time to identify
a correct reconstruction even though it searches for the right z from R random
initializations and optimizes in L back-propagations, with typical R = 10 and
L = 200. As we discussed in Sec. 3, Defense-VAE identifies a proper z directly
by forward-propagating the input adversarial image through the VAE-encoder,
and reconstructs a high quality denoised image through the VAE-decoder, and
no online iterative optimization is involved.
Original Image Adversarial Image Reconstrution by GAN Reconstrution by VAE
Fig. 5. The example reconstructions by Defense-VAE and Defense-GAN from the
black-box FGSM attacks on F-MNIST: (a) original images; (b) adversarial images;
(c) reconstruction by Defense-GAN; (d) reconstruction by Defense-VAE.
4.5 Defense Speed
Besides the superior defense accuracy of Defense-VAE, another advantage of
Defense-VAE is its superior defense speed over Defense-GAN. As discussed above,
to identify a high quality reconstruction, Defense-VAE doesn’t need expensive
online iterative optimizations, while Defense-GAN requires L iterative back-
propagations with R random restarts. To have a quantitative speed comparison
between Defense-VAE and Defense-GAN, we calculate their reconstruction times
on 1000 adversarial images from F-MNIST, with the results reported in Table 4,
where different R and L configurations are considered.
As we can see, compared to the default Defense-GAN configuration, i.e.,
L = 200 and R = 10, Defense-VAE is about 50x faster than Defense-GAN.
Moreover, as L and R increase, Defense-GAN generally has a slightly better
defense accuracy, but the run time also increases linearly as O(L × R). The
constant run-time complexity of Defense-VAE makes it widely deployable in
real-time security-sensitive systems.
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Defense Method
Run Time on
1000 Images (s)
Defense-VAE 9.03
Defense-GAN
L∗ = 200, R∗ = 10 441.81
L = 400, R = 10 875.48
L = 200, R = 20 876.10
L = 400, R = 20 1720.13
Table 4. Run Time Comparison between Defense-VAE and Defense-GAN, where ∗
denotes Defense-GAN recommended configuration.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose Defense-VAE, a fast and accurate defense algorithm
against adversarial attacks. The algorithm is generic and can defense both white-
box and black-box attacks without the need of retraining the original CNN
classifier, and can further boost the defense strength by retraining or end-to-
end finetuning. Compared with the state-of-the-art algorithms, in particular,
Defense-GAN, our algorithm outperforms them in almost all white-box and
black-box defense benchmarks. In addition, Defense-VAE is very efficient as com-
pared to the optimization-based defense alternatives, such as Defense-GAN, as
no expensive iterative online optimizations is needed. Speed test shows that
Defense-VAE is about 50x faster than Defense-VAE. Given the superior defense
accuracy and speed, we believe Defense-VAE is widely deployable in real-time
security-sensitive systems.
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A Network Architectures
The details of network architectures used in our experiments are described. Ta-
ble 5 shows the architectures of the CNN classifiers and their substitute models,
which are identical to those used in Defense-GAN [29] for a fair comparison.
A B C D E
Conv(*, 64, 5, 1, 2) Dropout(0.2) Conv(*, 128, 3, 1, 1) FC(200) FC(200)
ReLU Conv(*, 64, 8, 2, 5) ReLU ReLU ReLU
Conv(64, 64, 5, 2, 0) ReLU Conv(128, 64, 5, 2, 0) Dropout(0.5) FC(200)
ReLU Conv(64, 128, 6, 2, 0) ReLU FC(200) ReLU
Dropout(0.25) ReLU Dropout(0.25) ReLU FC(10) + Softmax
FC(128) Conv(128, 128, 5, 1, 0) FC(128) Dropout(0.25)
ReLU ReLU ReLU FC(10) + Softmax
Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5)
FC(10) + Softmax FC(10) + Softmax FC(10) + Softmax
Table 5. The architectures of the classifiers and the substitute models used in the
white-box and black-box attacks.
Encoder Decoder
Conv(*, 64, 5, 1, 2) + BN + ReLU FC(128, 4096) + ReLU
Conv(64, 64, 4, 2, 3) + BN + ReLU ConvT(256, 128, 4, 2, 1) + BN + ReLU
Conv(64, 128, 4, 2, 1) + BN + ReLU ConvT(128, 64, 4, 2, 1) + BN + ReLU
Conv(128, 256, 4, 2, 1) + BN + ReLU ConvT(64, 64, 4, 2, 3) + BN + ReLU
FC1(4096, 128), FC2(4096, 128) ConvT(64, 64, 5, 1, 2) + BN + ReLU
Table 6. The encoder and decoder of Defense-VAE used in the experiments.
Table 6 shows the architecture of the Defense-VAE model used in the exper-
iments on MNIST and F-MNIST. The architectures used for CelebA [15] and
CIFAR-10 [12] are largely the same except that they are 1 or 2 layers deeper.
B Experiments on CelebA and CIFAR-10
We perform the white-box and black-box attacks on CelebA [15] and CIFAR-
10 [12] datasets, with the results provided in Tables 7 and 8. Since Defense-GAN
didn’t provide results on CIFAR-10, we run their code on it and make sure the
experimental settings for both algorithms are the same. We didn’t provide the
results related to the classifier model B due to its improper configuration for
CIFAR-10, e.g., model B has much more parameters due to the large convolu-
tional kernel size (e.g., 8× 8) and 3 input channels.
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Attack
Classifier
Model
No
Attack
No
Defense
Defense
VAE
Defense
VAE-REC
Defense
VAE-E2E
Defense
GAN
MagNet
Adv. Tr.
 = 0.3
FGSM
 = 0.3
A 96.55 3.94 92.40 94.89 95.10 92.55 9.85 12.25
B 93.69 5.20 90.05 92.45 92.85 91.40 9.20 23.45
C 95.62 4.45 92.47 94.46 95.25 92.55 10.85 11.30
D 94.89 5.92 90.05 93.66 93.91 92.05 9.75 77.55
RAND
FGSM
 = 0.3
α = 0.05
A 96.55 4.04 92.11 94.56 95.34 92.80 11.05 7.00
B 93.69 4.76 90.55 92.57 93.07 90.30 10.15 45.15
C 95.62 5.12 91.70 93.76 94.15 92.00 10.45 10.55
D 94.89 6.15 91.42 93.53 93.87 91.65 11.05 6.96
CW
l2 norm
A 96.55 4.94 93.70 95.07 95.90 82.10 9.85 56.90
B 93.69 4.90 90.65 92.40 93.55 74.65 9.55 7.25
C 95.62 8.00 93.28 94.57 95.92 79.85 9.85 26.35
D 94.89 6.47 91.15 93.12 93.39 77.40 10.40 50.10
Average 95.19 5.32 91.63 93.75 94.36 87.44 10.17 27.90
Attack
Classifier
Model
No
Attack
No
Defense
Defense
VAE
Defense
VAE-REC
Defense
VAE-E2E
Defense
GAN
FGSM
 = 0.3
A 86.52 2.44 44.86 48.52 50.72 51.92
C 87.62 5.05 43.92 47.29 47.39 47.84
D 61.76 8.24 47.75 50.69 53.36 33.80
RAND
FGSM
 = 0.3
α = 0.05
A 86.52 3.71 39.84 47.80 50.51 50.36
C 87.62 3.87 41.28 46.16 47.91 48.52
D 61.76 7.94 47.88 50.67 51.18 26.78
CW
l2 norm
A 86.52 2.34 38.41 45.91 49.44 45.62
C 87.62 7.13 41.21 46.26 46.19 43.87
D 61.76 7.78 53.32 55.81 57.21 20.35
Average 78.63 5.39 44.27 48.79 50.43 41.01
Table 7. Classification accuracies of different defense methods under FGSM, RAND-
FGSM and CW white-box attacks on CelebA and CIFAR-10. Since the Defense-GAN
paper didnt provide the white-box attack results on CIFAR-10, we run their code and
provide the results in the table.
Classifier/
Substitute
No
Attack
No
Defense
Defense-
VAE
Defense-
VAE-REC
Defense-
VAE-E2E
Defense-
GAN
C/E 87.62 14.13 37.22 42.68 45.72 20.24
D/E 61.76 10.39 32.60 38.10 37.18 11.68
Average 74.69 12.16 34.91 40.39 41.45 16.32
Table 8. Classification accuracies under FGSM black-box attacks on CIFAR-10. Since
the Defense-GAN paper didnt provide the black-box attack results on CIFAR-10, we
run their code and provide the results in the table.
